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Redacted Disclosure 
Abstract 
In this paper we investigate a firm’s decision to redact proprietary information from its 
material contract filings.  Information redaction results when the Security and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) grants a firm’s request to withhold information from investors in its 
material contract filings, presumably because the information is proprietary.  We 
hypothesize that when firms redact information, measures of adverse selection 
deteriorate.  That is, the redaction of proprietary information from material contracts 
should be associated with: a larger adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread; 
reductions in market depth; and lower market turnover.  In addition, we conjecture that 
the decision to redact depends on whether the firm plans on raising capital, the 
competitiveness of the firm’s industry, and the performance of the firm.  Overall the 
results of our analysis generally support our predictions.  We find that when firms redact 
information, contemporaneous measures of the adverse selection component of the bid-
ask spread rise, and market depth and share turnover deteriorate; this suggests an increase 
in adverse selection.  We also find firms are less likely to redact when they issue long 
term debt, and are more likely to redact when they are in a competitive industry or 
experience losses. 
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1.  Introduction 
 An economic consequence commonly associated with a firm’s disclosure choice 
is the severity of the adverse selection problem inherent in the buying and selling of firm 
shares.  For example, decreased disclosure should exacerbate adverse selection, thereby 
increasing the extent to which parties to a transaction involved in the purchase or sale of 
firm shares need to price-protect themselves.  Adverse selection severity should be 
manifest in a variety of market proxies, such as bid-ask spreads, market depth, and share 
turnover.  In addition, it should be associated with that part of the firm’s cost of capital 
that arises from information asymmetry between the firm and its shareholders, and/or 
among investors.1   
Despite these claims, recent work posits that when firms report under US 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (US-GAAP), the richness of the information 
environment may preclude finding a relation between a firm’s disclosure choice and the 
economic consequences related to that choice.2  This is likely the cause of the mixed 
results from research that explores the association between the cost of capital and 
disclosure.3 
For example, Botosan (1997) finds that there is a significant relation between her 
measure of the extent of disclosure and the cost of capital, but this relation only exists for 
firms that have low analyst following.  Botosan and Frost (1998), using a similar 
disclosure metric, find that foreign firms that trade in U.S. equity markets and make more 
timely disclosures have higher liquidity.  They do not find results on the level of 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) and Verrecchia (2001). 
2 See, for example, Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) and Verrecchia (2001). 
3 Leuz and Verrechia (2000) provide evidence that measures of accounting quality are associated with 
measures of the cost of capital in Germany’s Neuer market. 
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disclosure and the cost of capital.  Sengupta (1998) investigates whether disclosure is 
associated with the cost of debt, and finds that firms that have higher analyst disclosure 
ratings have lower costs of debt.  Welker (1995) and Healy, Hutton, and Palepu (1999) 
find a similar association between the cost of equity capital and analyst ratings.  Leuz and 
Verrecchia (2000), however, highlight the difficulty in drawing inferences from 
associations between analyst ratings and cost of capital, in that analyst ratings only 
measure an analyst’s perception of the quality of the firm’s disclosure.      
In an attempt to find a disclosure choice under US-GAAP that may lead to a 
relation between that choice and a firm’s cost of capital through adverse selection, we 
consider firms that withhold proprietary information from investors by redacting the 
information from their material contract filings.4  Regulation S-K requires all material 
contracts or agreements into which a firm enters to be filed with its 8K, 10K, 10Q, or 
registration statements.5  If a contract is definitively material in that all of the firm’s 
auditors, the SEC, and plaintiffs bar conclude that an average investor ought to be 
informed, then the firm must disclose the contract.  The SEC does provide firms, 
however, with an element of discretion by allowing firms to request that proprietary 
information contained within the contract be withheld.6  If the SEC grants the firm’s 
request for confidentiality, investors and other financial statement users will have no 
access to the redacted data (although the SEC will).  By redacting data, firms are able to 
                                                 
4 Carter and Soo (1999) examine the information content of 8k disclosures and find that the market does 
react to the information in the 8k (either shortly before the 8k is filed, or on the filing date).  One piece of 
information that can be contained in an 8k is a material contract.  Thus this study implies that the market 
considers material contracts to be value relevant.   
5 For a more precise description of the SEC’s regulations regarding the filing of material contracts see 
Regulation SK subpart 229.600 - Exhibits.  An electronic version of regulation SK can be found at 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/forms/regsk.htm 
6 Rule 406 under the Securities Act of 1933 and Rule 24b-2 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
provide a detailed description of when,how, and the process a firm must go through to request to have 
information redacted from a filing. 
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avoid disclosing information that they deem proprietary, thereby reducing the overall 
amount of information that is disclosed to the public.  Over the past decade requests for 
confidential treatment have burgeoned, even though the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) makes it difficult for firms to withhold redacted information indefinitely.   
For example, in a recent legal bulletin by the SEC’s Division of Corporate 
Finance, the SEC indicates that “in recent years, the number of confidential treatment 
requests (‘CTRs’ or ‘applications’) processed by the Division has increased steadily from 
approximately 540 in fiscal year 1992 to more than 1,000 in fiscal year 1996.”7  A text 
search of Lexis-Nexis for the year 2000 using the phrase “confidential treatment” 
indicates that as many as 4000 documents filed in association with the firm’s 10K 
mention confidential treatment. So as to avoid having to disclose these contracts under 
the FOIA, the SEC states:  “most applicants rely on the [FOIA] exemption that covers 
trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and 
privileged or confidential.”8 
 In light of firms applying for and receiving confidential treatment in the presence 
of materiality, there may exist substantial heterogeneity in the quality and quantity of 
information disclosed in the material contract portion of the firm’s financial statements.  
We provide evidence on the consequences of the decision to reduce disclosure by 
investigating how the redaction of material contract information from financial reports 
affects firms’ proxies for adverse selection.  We also investigate possible determinants of 
the decision to redact financial information from a firm’s financial reports.    
                                                 
7 See the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance Staff Legal Bulletin No. 1 (with Addendum) 
"Confidential Treatment Requests" Action:   Publication of CF Staff Legal Bulletin, February 28, 1997. 
8 Division of Corporation Finance Staff Legal Bulletin No. 1 (1997). 
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Redaction allows firms with “bad news” to pool with firms with “better news,” 
but not sufficiently better to warrant bearing the proprietary costs associated with full 
disclosure (e.g., Verrecchia, 1983).  This creates adverse selection in the market for 
firms’ shares.  For example, we predict that firms that choose to redact information 
encounter higher adverse selection through: a larger adverse selection component of the 
bid-ask spread; smaller quoted dollar-depths; and lower share turnover. We also 
hypothesize that firms are less likely to redact information in years in which they issue 
stock or public debt.  Finally, we hypothesize that the degree of competition in a firm’s 
product markets and the profitability of the firm affect the decision to redact information. 
We use the material contract disclosures in the 10K to identify firms that redact 
material contract information from their financial reports.  We focus our analysis on 
small, publicly traded, non-financial companies that filed at least one material contract 
during fiscal 2001. We focus on small firms for two reasons.  First, small firms are less 
likely to be followed by analysts, and are less likely to have competing sources of 
information available.  Thus, the redaction of proprietary information is likely to be a 
more significant event.  Second, we hand-collect redaction data.  This precludes us from 
using a large sample of firms and examining the effects of firm size. 
We find that slightly more than 15% of the firms in our sample elected to redact 
information from their material contract disclosures during the fiscal year 2001, and over 
25% of our firms disclosed that they had redacted information from at least one material 
contract in the past.  These statistics suggest that there is a significant amount of variation 
in the extent of the disclosure of material contract information. 
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We find that the adverse selection component of the firm’s bid-ask spread is 
larger when the firm redacts material contract information.  We also find that the quoted 
dollar depth and share turnover decrease when firms redact information from their 
material contract filings.  In addition, we provide preliminary evidence on the 
determinants of the decision to redact information.  We find that firms are less likely to 
redact financial information when they issue long term debt. We also find that firms are 
more likely to redact when they have suffered financial losses. Both of these results are 
consistent with the extant literature that finds that disclosure is associated with the 
propensity to raise capital and firm profitability.   
We also find that firms are less likely to redact information when they face less 
competition.  In their review article on the empirical disclosure literature, Healy and 
Palepu (2001) posit that there is little evidence on the relationship between competition 
and disclosure. Thus, our results on industry competition are potentially interesting as 
they provide some insight into how competition affects disclosure choices.  
We conclude our analysis by investigating whether our results are attributable to a 
self-selection bias.  Using the Heckman self-selection correction methodology (Heckman, 
1976), we find that for two of our three adverse selection measures (the adverse selection 
component of the bid-ask spread and dollar depth), the potential bias does not affect our 
results.  The results on share turnover are insignificant after controlling for self-selection.  
This suggests that the type of firm that redacts information affects share turnover.  
Finally, in untabulated sensitivity analyses we investigate whether these results are 
sensitive to alternative adverse selection measures and alternative measures of the extent 
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of redaction; we find that our results are not sensitive to these alternative research design 
choices.   
 Overall, the results of this paper indicate that there is a relation between a firm’s 
decision to redact material contract disclosures and measures of adverse selection even 
though US GAAP effectuates a rich disclosure environment.  In addition, we find that 
small firms are more likely to redact when they are in more competitive industries.   
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2 we state our 
hypotheses, and in Section 3 introduce the instruments used to test them.  In Section 4 we 
discuss the sample selection procedures, and in Section 5 provide a detailed explanation 
of the research design.  Section 6 discusses results, and Section 7 offers concluding 
comments. 
2.  Hypothesis Development 
 
Our hypotheses about the effects of redacting proprietary information from a 
firm’s material contract filings are based on conventional notions of how disclosure 
affects trade in firm shares.  Redaction provides a refuge, or “safe harbor,” for firms with 
“bad news” to pool with firms with “better news” by appealing to the rationale that the 
news is proprietary.  This exacerbates adverse selection, thereby increasing the extent to 
which parties to a transaction involved in the purchase or sale of firm shares need to 
price-protect themselves.   
The literature offers a variety of ways to measure adverse selection.  The 
measures we examine are bid-ask spreads, market depth, and share turnover.  Jaffe and 
Winkler (1976) and Stoll (1978) argue that the firm’s bid-ask spread is related to the 
extent of information asymmetry about the firm.  They assert that market makers face 
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potential losses when trading against informed investors.  To protect themselves from 
these losses, market makers increase bid-ask spreads as the probability that they are 
trading against informed investors increases.  Glosten and Harris (1988) introduce a 
methodology to identify the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread.  We use 
this methodology to develop our bid-ask spread measure. 
Easly, Kiefer, O’Hara, and Paperman (1996) and Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) 
suggest that share volume is related to costs that arise from adverse selection.  Illiquid 
stocks have large variation in order flow; active days are interspersed with slow days.  If 
private information motivates trades on active days, market makers could be subject to 
large losses.  This suggests that firms with low trade volumes are more likely to 
experience costs related to adverse selection.  We use this methodology to develop our 
share turnover measure. 
Lee, Muckalow, and Ready (1994) and Callahan, Lee, and Yohn (1996) assert 
that in addition to bid-ask spreads, market makers adjust market depth to reduce the costs 
associated with traders that have an informational advantage.  That is, when market 
makers are more likely to be trading against investors with superior information, market 
makers have an incentive to reduce the number of shares they are willing to trade at the 
quoted prices. By reducing depth, market makers can reduce their exposure to trading 
against informed traders.  Consistent with this conjecture, Heflin and Shaw (2001) find a 
significant negative correlation (75%) between the adverse selection component of the 
firm’s bid-ask spread and quoted depth.  We follow Rogers (2005), and use quoted dollar 
depths as our depth measure. 
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Our first hypothesis is that these three measures (i.e., the adverse selection 
component of their bid-ask spreads, share turnover, and quoted market depths) deteriorate 
when firms redact information from their disclosures.   
We also examine the determinants of the decision to redact.  Here, we rely 
primarily on the hypotheses developed in the extant literature for the factors that are 
expected to affect the decision to disclosure.  For example, we hypothesize that the 
decision to redact material contract information depends on whether the firm plans to 
issue stock or debt.  Lang and Lundholm (1993, 1997), Frankel et al. (1995), and 
Sengupta (1998) find that firms increase disclosure or provide higher quality disclosures 
in anticipation of upcoming public debt or equity offerings. These studies imply that 
firms are less likely to redact information if they plan a public debt or equity offering in 
the future. 
Next, we hypothesize that the decision to redact information depends on 
competitiveness in a firm’s product market.  The theoretical literature offers conflicting 
arguments as to how competition affects the firm’s decision to disclose proprietary 
information.  Darrough and Stoughton (1990) argue that greater competition fosters 
greater disclosure as a device to thwart entry into a product market.  Alternatively, 
Verrecchia (1990) argues that greater competition inhibits disclosure in markets 
comprised of mature competitors (i.e., post-entry).  Healy and Palepu (2001) posit that 
the empirical literature offers little direct evidence on how competition affects the 
decision to disclose proprietary information (pg 424).  This may be in part attributable to 
the difficulty in measuring proprietary costs.  The conflicting theoretical predictions, in 
combination with the absence of empirical evidence on how competition affects 
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disclosure, suggests that it is not clear how competition affects a firm’s decision to redact 
material contract information. 
Our final hypothesis is that firm performance affects the decision to redact 
information.  Lang and Lundholm (1993) argue that it is not clear how firm performance 
affects the decision to disclose.  Profitable firms may choose not to disclose because 
disclosure encourages entrance and competition. Alternatively, if there are costs to 
disclosure, then more profitable firms have stronger incentives to disclose and reduce 
costs that result from adverse selection.  Thus, it is not clear whether performance is 
positively or negatively associated with the extent of disclosure.  In the next section we 
develop instruments to test our hypotheses.  
3.  Proxy Development 
 
 In the previous section we hypothesize that redaction affects adverse selection.  
To determine whether firms redact information from their material contract filings, we 
must first determine whether a firm has entered into a material contract, and then 
determine whether the firm has redacted information from the contract.  Firms enter into 
material contracts throughout the year.  The SEC requires that when a firm enters into a 
material contract, they file an 8K.  Practically, instead of filing an 8K, many firms elect to 
disclose the existence of the contract in their next SEC filing.  Thus material contracts are 
often filed with the firms 10K, 10Q, registration statements, 8K, proxy statements, etc. 
Fortunately, to determine whether a firm filed a material contract we do not have 
to search each SEC filing.  Instead, the SEC requires each firm to maintain an exhibit list 
of all material contracts that the firm has entered into in the past year.9    This exhibit list 
                                                 
9 The exhibit list also includes a reference to all unexpired material contracts that the firm has entered into 
in the past. 
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can usually be found under item 14 in the firm’s 10K. 10  We use the exhibit list to 
identify all material contract filings made by the firm starting the first day of fiscal 2001 
and ending three months after the last day of fiscal 2001.  Material contracts are always 
filed as exhibit 10.XXX, where the XXX is the exhibit number.  The exhibit list typically 
reports the nature of the contract, whether the firm has requested confidential treatment, 
and the filing in which the material contract was disclosed.  We use this exhibit list to 
determine whether firms redact information from their filings. 
For each firm’s 2001 fiscal year we go through the exhibit index and identify all 
material contracts the firm filed starting with the first day of fiscal 2001, and ending three 
months after the last day of fiscal 2001.  We then identify all material contracts in which 
the firm was granted a request for confidential treatment.  Typically, one can quickly 
identify a contract that was redacted by searching for the phrase “Confidential treatment.”  
We then create an indicator variable, Redactdum, that is one for each firm that filed a 
request confidential treatment for material contract information during the 15 month 
period beginning the first day of fiscal 2001 and ending three months after the last day of 
fiscal 2001, and is zero otherwise.11  
As we discuss above, we employ three measures of adverse selection.  The first 
measure is the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread.  To calculate the bid-
                                                 
10 See Section 66000 of regulation S-K entitled Exhibits (Item 601) for the SEC’s rules regarding the filing 
of material contracts. 
11 To identify the date that the market learns that the firm requested confidential treatment for a material 
contract, we started with the exhibit list to identify requests for confidential treatment and the relevant SEC 
filing in which the material contract was filed.  We then used Lexis/Nexis to obtain the date of the filing 
that first mentions the material contract with redacted data.  Firms often file material contracts multiple 
times, thus there may be several filings mentioning the redacted contract.  Thus, to ensure that we properly 
identified the first mention of the redacted contract, for each firm with a redacted contract, we searched the 
firm’s 10K, 10Q, 8K, and registration statements using the phrase “confidential treatment” for fiscal years 
2000, 2001 and 2002.   This procedure allowed us to identify several instances where the exhibit list did not 
correctly identify the first filing of the redacted contract.   
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ask spread for each firm, we follow the methodology suggested in Glosten and Harris 
(1988).  We start by collecting all of the quote data on the TAQ database for the 15-
month period beginning the first day of fiscal year 2001 and ending 3 months after the 
end of the fiscal year.  We focus on this sample period to ensure that our spread variable 
reflects any material contract disclosed in a fiscal year 2001 SEC report.  We eliminate 
any trades that did not occur on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ exchanges.  We also 
eliminate any quotes that were not made under normal market conditions (i.e., all quotes 
that do not have a mode=12 on the TAQ database).  We also eliminate all aggregate 
quotes, and all quotes that occur outside normal trading hours.  We follow a similar 
procedure for the trade data, and then use the procedure suggested by Lee and Ready 
(1991) to match the quote data and the trade data.  We then run the following regression 
for each firm using fifteen months of trade and quote data: 
∆Pricet = C0∆Quotet + C1∆QuotetTrdsizet +Z0Quotet + Z1QuotetTrdsizet + ε. 
where:  
Price is the observed transaction price,  
TrdSize is number of shares traded in the transaction at time t, and  
Quote is an indicator that is equal to +1 if the quote is classified as buyer initiated and -1 
if the transaction is seller initiated (we use the methodology proposed in Lee and Ready 
(1991) to classify trades as buys or sells.)   
 
Glosten and Harris indicate that the adverse selection component of a particular 
trade is calculated as 2(Z0 + Z1*Trdsizet).  We express adverse selection as a proportion 
of the spread.  Thus for each firm we calculate the average trade size and calculate the 
ratio:    
2(Z0 + Z1*AvgTrdsizet)  
2(Z0 + Z1*AvgTrdsizet) + 2(C0 + C1*AvgTrdsizet),  
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where the numerator is the adverse selection component associated with the average trade 
and the denominator is the bid-ask spread for the average trade.  We define the variable 
Adv_select to be equal to this ratio. 
Our second proxy for adverse selection is the firm’s quoted market depth 
expressed in dollars.   To calculate the firm’s dollar-depth, we again start by collecting 
quote data from TAQ for the 15-month period beginning the first day of fiscal year 2001.  
We eliminate any trades that did not occur on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ 
exchanges, and any trades not made under normal market conditions.  We also eliminate 
all aggregate quotes, and all quotes that occur outside normal trading hours.  For each 
resulting transaction we calculate the dollar depth by adding the number of shares offered 
at the bid multiplied by the bid price, and the number of shares offered at the ask 
multiplied by the asking price.  We divide the resulting sum by 2.  The resulting variable 
is a measure of quoted dollar depth for the transaction.  We then calculate the median 
dollar depth for each firm/day in our sample for the 15 month period beginning the first 
day of fiscal year 2001 and ending 3 months after the end of the fiscal year.  The final 
variable $Depth is the average of these daily dollar depths. 
Our final proxy for adverse selection is a measure of the firm’s monthly share 
turnover for the 15-month period beginning the first day of fiscal year 2001 and ending 3 
months after the end of the fiscal year to measure the liquidity of the firm’s stock.    We 
collect the number of shares outstanding and the number of shares traded for each month 
of our sample period from the CRSP database.  We then divide the number of shares 
traded by the number of shares outstanding; the resulting quotient is our measure of 
 13
monthly turnover. Finally, we take the average of the monthly turnover to create the 
variable, Monthly_Turnover.  
 The literatures of both finance and accounting suggest that market measures of 
adverse selection are likely to be influenced by factors other than disclosure choices.  We 
construct several control variables to proxy for these other factors.  First, consistent with 
Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) and Chiang and Venkatesh (1993), we control for the size of 
the firm using the variable LnMVE.  LnMVE is calculated by taking the natural log of 
the firm’s market value as of December 31, 2001.  Following Christie and Huang (1992) 
and Huang and Stoll (1996), we also control for the exchange the firm is traded on by 
using two indicator variables (NYSE and AMEX). These variables equal one if a firm is 
traded on the New York Stock Exchange or the American Stock Exchange, respectively, 
and equal zero otherwise. Third, following Benston and Hagerman (1974) and Coller and 
Yohn (1997), we control for the firm’s share price using the variable LnPrice.  LnPrice 
is calculated by first taking the firm’s average share price for the 15-month period 
beginning the first day of fiscal year 2001, and ending 3 months after the end of the fiscal 
year.  We then take the natural log of the average share price.   
Our analysis of the factors that affect the decision to redact predicts that the 
redaction decision depends on the firm’s propensity to issue capital, the competitiveness 
of the firm’s industry, and the profitability of the firm.  We use two different data sources 
to determine whether firms issue debt or equity.  For equity issuances, we use the SDC 
database of seasoned equity offerings.  For debt issuances, we use data item 111 on the 
Compustat database (long term debt issuances per the financing section of the statement 
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of cash-flows).12  We create two indicator variables Equity_issue and Debt-Issue that are 
set equal to one if SDC or Compustat indicates the firm issued equity or debt, 
respectively, and are otherwise zero. 
 We use the ranks of the Herfindahl index (Hindex) to measure the 
competitiveness of the firm’s industry, calculated at the two-digit SIC level.  We use the 
firm’s return on assets (ROA), and an indicator variable that is one if the firm has 
suffered a loss (LOSS) as proxies for the firm’s profitability.  We also include controls 
for size (LNMVE) and the number of exhibits filed in 2001 (Num_Exhibits).  We expect 
a mechanical relation between redaction and the number of exhibits filed, as firms that 
file more exhibits are more likely to have an exhibit that contains proprietary information.     
4.  Sample Selection 
 
         Table 1 describes our sample selection process.  We start with the 671 firms on the 
CRSP database that have a market value of equity between $50 and $100 million as of 
December 31, 2001. We focus on this segment of the market, as there are likely to be 
relatively few analysts following these firms and limited press coverage.  Thus, there is 
likely to be a relatively larger impact (in terms of adverse selection) when relatively 
small, publicly traded companies withhold information by requesting confidential 
treatment. 
We then eliminate 56 firms from the sample because they are in the banking 
industry, and 40 firms that have missing 10K data or exhibit data that is missing from the 
10K filing.  Banks are eliminated form the sample because they are subject to additional 
                                                 
12 We did use the SDC database to identify long term debt issuances, and Compustat to identify equity 
issuances, but both measures were fraught with omissions and coding problems.  Compustat lumps equity 
issuances and stock option exercises together, reducing the usefulness of this data item.  SDC often omits 
long term debt issuances for the small firms that populate our sample.  These data problems suggest that 
our variables may be measured with noise, which should bias against finding results. 
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regulatory disclosure requirements that are not captured in their SEC filings.  Firms that 
do not have 10K’s on Lexis are eliminated as we are unable to determine whether a 
contract has been redacted for these firms.   
For the 575 firms that are left in our sample, then we examine the material 
contract section to determine whether they have redacted contract information.  We found 
125 firms that had not made any material filings during the fiscal year 2001.  To increase 
the power of our tests, we eliminate these firms from the sample.  That is, firms that do 
not file any contracts in 2001 cannot make a redaction choice.  It is not clear how the 
market perceives these firms relative to the firms that do disclose material contract, and 
relative to those that redact.  Thus we exclude these firms from our sample.  The resulting 
sample of 450 firms is then merged with TAQ database to obtain data on the bid-ask 
spread and depth.  Of these 450 firms, 427 firms are covered on the TAQ database.  Thus, 
we delete an additional 23 firms from our sample for the analyses that require TAQ data.   
Table 2 provides an overview of the industry classification of the 450 firms in our 
final sample (by two digit SIC Code).  Other than SIC code 73, which has roughly 20% 
of our sample, there does not appear to be a significant clustering in any other industry.  
To ensure that industry clustering does not drive our results, we include industry controls 
in our examination of the effect of redaction on adverse selection. Each industry with 
more than 20 firms has its own indicator variable in that analysis.13  
4.1  Description of the Types of Exhibits Disclosed or Redacted. 
 
                                                 
13 We replicated all tests in the paper excluding these variables, and our test variables remain statistically 
significant at conventional levels.  It is also important to note that we do not include industry controls in the 
determinants model, as the Herfindal index is determined at the industry level, and this would be collinear 
with the industry dummies. 
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 Because we are unaware of any other paper that examines the types of 
information disclosed as a material contract in the 10K and the types of information 
redacted from the 10K, Table 3 provides summary level data for our sample.  In Panel A 
we focus on the contracts that were disclosed in the 10K; in panel B we focus on the 
contracts that were redacted. 
 We create 9 different categories to describe the types of data disclosed as material 
exhibits.  The first category relates to the debt contracts filed by the firm.  In this category 
we include all debt contracts, loans, waivers, loan amendments, letter agreements, and 
guarantees.    
The second category includes all employment related contracts.  This category 
includes option plans, deferred compensation plans, bonus plans, retirement plans, 
pension plans, and incentive plans.  In addition we also found numerous instances of 
employment offer letters, union contracts, consulting agreements, severance agreements, 
change in control agreements, and other employment related contracts.   
 The third category includes contracts that relate to the sale and/or purchase of 
assets (other than inventory).  In addition to the SEC’s guidance on materiality, discussed 
above, the SEC also indicates that any sale or purchase of assets that is greater than 15% 
of the firm’s fixed assets must be disclosed.14  The fourth category includes all contracts 
that relate to the purchase and sale of inventory or services.  The fifth category includes 
all license agreements, and the sixth category includes equity related agreements such as 
rights agreements, stock purchase or sale agreements, and warrants.  The seventh 
category includes all leases.  In each of these categories the SEC provides no guidance on 
the definition of materiality (other then the general guidance discussed above).   
                                                 
14 See subpart 229.600 — Exhibits of the SEC’s Regulation S-K for this rule. 
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 The eighth category includes all contracts related to mergers and acquisition 
agreements.  Generally, the SEC requires the actual merger agreements to be filed as an 
Exhibit 2.XXX.  There are often ancillary agreements, however, that get filed as material 
contracts.  The final category, other, captures the assortment of miscellaneous contracts 
filed with the SEC. 
 Panel A of Table 3 indicates that firms most often file employment related 
contracts with the SEC followed by debt agreements, miscellaneous agreements, and 
equity related contracts.  Focusing on the total sample, the firms in our sample filed an 
average of 7 contracts in fiscal 2001. 
Panel B of Table 3 indicates that firms seldom redact data from debt related 
contracts, employment agreements, lease agreements, merger agreements and asset 
purchase agreements.  This is not particularly surprising, as it is difficult to justify that 
these types of contracts contain proprietary information.  Firms most often redact data 
from the miscellaneous contracts that they file, from their license agreements, and from 
purchase and sale agreements.  These types of contracts are much more likely to contain 
cost and pricing data that is likely to be proprietary.  At the bottom of Panel B we 
tabulate the number of firms in our sample that redacted data during fiscal year 2001, and 
find that 74 of the 450 firms in our sample, 16%, elected to redact data.  We also 
examined the exhibit list to determine, historically, how often the firms in our sample 
redact data.   We found that at least 122 of the 450 firms in our sample, 27%, had a 
request for confidential treatment granted at some point in their history.15 
                                                 
15 It is possible that several other firms requested confidential treatment for a contract at some point in their 
history, and this has not been disclosed in the 10K because the contract is no longer relevant.  In this case, 
in the periods when the contract was relevant, the confidential status would have been disclosed in the 
exhibit list. 
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5.  Research Design 
 
Our first analysis focuses on the relation between disclosure and adverse 
selection.  That is, we run the following regressions: 
 
Adv_Select = α Intercept   β1 RedactDum + β2LnNumofExib +   β3LnMVE + β4NYSE + 
β5 AMEX  + β6 LNPrice + ε         (1) 
 
 $Depth = α Intercept + β1 RedactDum + β2LnNumofExib +   β3LnMVE + β4NYSE + β5 
AMEX + β6 LNPrice + ε        (2) 
 
MonthlyTurnover = α Intercept + β1 RedactDum + β2LnNumofExib +   β3LnMVE + 
β4NYSE + β5 AMEX + β6 LNPrice + ε,      (3) 
        
 
where the variables are defined as follows.  
 
Adv_Select  - We use the methodology proposed in Glosten and Harris (1988) and the 
trade identification procedure proposed by Lee and Ready (1991) to calculate the 
percentage of the spread that is related to adverse selection.  We use the in trade and 
quote data for our sample firms for the 15 month period beginning the first day of fiscal 
year 2001 and ending 3 months after the end of the fiscal year. 
$Depth – Calculated using the TAQ quote files.  We first calculate the dollar depth for an 
individual trade by adding the number of shares offered at the bid multiplied by the bid 
price and the number of shares offered at the ask multiplied by the asking price.  We 
divide the resulting sum by 2.  The resulting variable is a measure of quoted $Depth.  
Finally, we then calculate the median $depth for each firm/day in our sample for the 15 
month period beginning the first day of fiscal year 2001 and ending 3 months after the 
end of the fiscal year.  The final variable is the average of these daily $depths. 
Monthly Turnover – Calculated by dividing the monthly volume of shares traded by the 
number of shares outstanding for each firm month for the 15 month period beginning the 
first day of fiscal year 2001 and ending 3 months after the end of the fiscal year.  The 
average monthly turnover for the firm is then determined. 
Redactdum – An indicator variable set equal to one if the firm filed a requests for 
confidential treatment for the fiscal year 2001, zero otherwise. 
Ln(Num of Exib) –  Calculated as the natural log of the number of exhibits filed in fiscal 
2001. 
LNMVE – The natural log of the firm’s market value of equity (in $100,000), calculated 
on December 31, 2001.  
NYSE – Indicator that is one if the firm is traded on the New York Stock Exchange, zero 
otherwise. 
AMEX- Indicator variable that is one if the firm is traded on the American stock 
exchange, zero otherwise. 
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LnPrice – The natural log of the median price per share for the 15 month period 
beginning the first day of fiscal year 2001 and ending 3 months after the end of the fiscal 
year. 
 
To provide evidence on the determinants of the decision to redact information 
from the contract, we run the following probit regression: 
Redactdum = α Intercept  + β1 Equity_Issue + β2 Debt_Issue + β3Hindex + β4ROA+ β5 
Loss  + β6 LnMVE  + β7 Ln(NumofExib)  + ε,      (4) 
 
where the variables are defines as follows. 
Redactdum  -  Indicator variable that is 1 if the firm redacted information form a 
disclosure during fiscal year 2001, 0 otherwise. 
Debt_Issue -  Indicator variable that is 1 if the firm issued debt during fiscal 2001 
(COMPUSTAT data item 111) , 0 otherwise. 
Equity_Issue – Indicator variable that is 1 if the firm issued equity during fiscal 2001 (as 
per the SDC database), 0 otherwise. 
Hindex – The rank of the industries Herfindahl index.  The Herfindahl index calculated 
as the sum of the squared market share of each publicly traded company in a particular 
the 2 digit SIC code.  Market share is calculated as the sales of a particular company 
divided by the total sales of the SIC code.  
ROA – Net income/Assets (CMPUSTAT data items 172 and 6). 
Loss – Indicator variable that is 1 if the firm had a loss, 0 otherwise. 
LNMVE – The natural log of the firm’s market value of equity (in $100,000), calculated 
on December 31, 2001.  
Ln(Num of Exib) –  Calculated as the natural log of the number of exhibits filed in fiscal 
2001. 
 
Our final analysis examines the association between disclosure and measures of 
adverse selection with controls for self-selection.  That is, we use the Heckmen (1976) 
self-selection correction methodology to control for the determinants of the firm’s 
decision to disclose or redact financial information.  To implement this methodology we 
first estimate the model of the determinants to redact information (model 4 above).  We 
then calculate the inverse mills ratios from this model and include it in our second stage 
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model of the determinants of our proxies for the extent of the firm’s adverse selection 
problem. 
6.  Results 
 
6.1  Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for our test and control variables.  We find 
that 16% of the firms in our sample issued equity while 44% of the firms issued some 
form of long term debt (either public or private).  We also find that over 60% of the firms 
in our sample suffered losses in fiscal 2001.  The average adverse selection component of 
the bid-ask spread for our sample firms is 19%.  The average quoted dollar-depth for our 
sample is $4400.  The average monthly turnover of the firm’s outstanding shares is 
approximately 8%.  Not surprisingly, these firms have lower depths and share turnover 
than the average firm on NYSE and NASDAQ.  This is primarily attributable to sampling 
only small firms from these exchanges. 
 The firms in our sample disclose an average of slightly more than 7 exhibits per 
year and redact data from 0.44 exhibits per year.  Because our sample is comprised of 
small firms, these averages may be significantly different than those of larger firms. 
6.2  Multivariate results 
In Table 5, we report our results on the association between our measures of 
adverse selection and the extent of redacted information.  Focusing on the first column of 
results, the adverse selection component of the firm’s bid-ask spread is positively 
associated with our proxy for the extent of redaction.  Market makers penalize trade in 
firms that redact information from their material contracts by increasing the cost of 
executing orders.  The economic significance of this coefficient suggests that the adverse 
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selection component of the bid-ask spread is 2% larger for firms that redact information 
from their material contracts. We also find all of our control variables are significant 
(other than the number of exhibits filed).  Larger firms enjoy less adverse selection.  
Compared to firms on NASDAQ, firms on NYSE experience less adverse selection while 
firms on AMEX experience more.  We also find that firms with higher prices experience 
more adverse selection. 
 The second column of results reports the determinants of quoted depth.  Firms 
that withhold information by redacting data have relatively smaller dollar depths. This 
suggests that when firms elect to redact information, the market maker responds by 
reducing the number of shares they are willing to buy or sell at their quoted prices.  This 
implies that redaction of data increases costs that result from adverse selection.  The 
coefficient of 5.99 indicates that the market maker reduces quoted depths by $599 when 
firms redact information from their material contracts.  We find that larger firms have 
marginally smaller quoted dollar depths.  The relatively small impact of firm size on 
depth is likely in part driven by the sample selection procedures that limit the size of the 
firms in this sample.  We also find that firms that have higher prices have greater depths.   
 The third column reports the results on turnover.  Firms that redact financial 
information appear to have lower shareholder turnover than firms that do not.  The 
redaction of information appears to reduce the average monthly turnover by 1%.  The 
control variables for the NYSE and Size are both statistically significant and positive, 
indicating that the larger firms and firms on NYSE enjoy a more liquid market.  The 
other control variables are not significant.  Overall the results from these three sets of 
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tests, reported on Table 5, support our hypotheses.  When firms redact information from 
their material contract disclosures, adverse selection increases.   
In Table 6 we report the results of our probit analysis, examining the determinants 
of the decision to redact information.  We find that firms are less likely to redact 
information when they issue long-term debt.  This is consistent with the extant literature 
which finds that firms tend to disclose more information in anticipation of raising capital.   
We also find that firms in less (more) competitive industries are less (more) likely 
to redact information from their material contracts.  This result suggests that small firms 
may choose to redact information to reduce the potential product market effects of 
disclosing proprietary information.  This is consistent with the theoretical literature that 
argues that competition reduces a firm’s propensity to make proprietary disclosures (e.g., 
Verrecchia, 1990).  In light of relatively little empirical evidence regarding the effect of 
competition on disclosure choices (e.g., Healy and Palepu, 2001), it is also a potentially 
important result in the empirical literature.  
We also find that loss firms are more likely to redact information.  Skinner (1997) 
argues that loss firms are more likely to disclose bad earnings-related news to reduce 
litigation costs.  Our results suggest that firms that suffer losses are more likely to 
withhold proprietary information from the market.  Because the SEC must approve these 
requests, they are unlikely to trigger litigation.  Not surprisingly, we also find that firms 
that file more exhibits are more likely to redact information. 
We recognize that the redaction of material contract information is a choice, and 
thus there may be systematic differences in the types of firms that redact information.  
This suggests that there may be a self-selection problem.  To address this problem we 
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employ the self-selection correction model advocated in Heckman (1976).  We use our 
model of the determinants of the decision to redact information to derive an inverse mills 
ratio, and include this ratio as an explanatory variable in our models of the determinants 
of adverse selection.  The results of this procedure are reported in Table 7. 
 The first and second columns of Table 7 suggest that controlling for self-selection 
does not appear to affect the relation between redaction and the adverse selection 
component of the firm’s bid-ask spread or dollar depth.  The third column suggests that 
self-selection does, in part, affect the relations between redaction and share turnover.  
Overall, after controlling for self-selection, it appears that firms that redact information 
are penalized through reduced depth and larger adverse selection component. 
6.3 Sensitivity Analyses 
 We investigate the sensitivity of our results to a number of our research design 
choices.  First, theory suggests that disclosure choices like redaction are likely to be 
related to public debt issuances, as opposed to private debt issuances (e.g., Sengupta, 
1998).  As we discuss above, our proxy for debt issuances includes both public and 
private debt issuances.  To provide evidence on whether redaction is associated with 
public debt issuances, we hand-collected data from the firm’s registration statements and 
used the SDC data on public debt issuances to determine whether the firms in our sample 
issued public debt.  We find relatively few instances of public debt being issued.  When 
we replace the debt issuance variable used in the main analysis with a variable that is 
based on the SDC data, the results on the debt issuance variable become insignificant.  
These results imply that information redaction is less likely to occur when firms enter 
into private debt contracts.  While this result may seem unusual, note that firms may be 
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entering into private debt contracts through syndicated loans, which are traded.  As such,  
investors who purchase syndicated debt will not have access to proprietary information. 
This may motivate firms to redact less.   
In addition, we replaced our measure of redaction with a continuous measure and 
find results qualitatively similar to those we report in Table 6.  We replaced our measure 
of the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread with the actual bid-ask spread 
and find that firms that redact information have larger spreads.  Finally, we replaced our 
dollar depth measure with the depth in shares and find qualitatively similar results. 
7.  Conclusion 
In this paper we attempt to relate the disclosure choices firms make with regard to 
redacting proprietary information from the material contracts filed with their financial 
statements, with various measures of the severity of the adverse selection problem in 
trade that involves firm securities.  Our predictions are based on the notion that redaction 
of proprietary information from a firm’s material contracts should manifest itself as an 
increase in the adverse selection component of the firm’s bid-ask spread, a reduction in 
market depth, and a reduction in market turnover.   
We find that firms that redact information from their material contracts filings 
during the fiscal year have a higher adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread, 
lower quoted dollar depths, and lower monthly turnover.  Cumulatively, we interpret the 
empirical evidence as confirming our prediction that there is a relation between firms’ 
disclosure choices and measures of adverse selection.  We also find that small, publicly 
traded companies are less likely to redact information from their material contract filings 
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when they issue debt, and more likely to redact information when they are in a 
competitive industry or suffering losses.   
These results imply that small firms in competitive industries elect to redact 
proprietary information from their material contracts.  The benefit of redaction is that 
these firms avoid the dissemination of proprietary information, which is harmful in their 
product markets.  The cost of redaction is that it results in increased adverse selection, 
which should be associated with that part of the firm’s cost of capital that arises from 
information asymmetry between the firm and its shareholders, and/or among investors.  
Presumably, these firms elect not to disclose because they are willing to trade off the 
former against the latter.   
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Table 1 
 
Sample Selection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 These 23 firms are included in the turnover analyses, as they have sufficient data to calculate our 
turnover metric. 
   
Firms on CRSP traded on NYSE 
AMEX or NASDAQ and with 
MVE between $50 - $100 million 
as of Dec 31, 2001 
 671 
   
Less:   
Firms in the banking industry 56  
Firms missing 10 K data on 
Lexis/Nexis or firms with missing 
exhibit lists 
40  
   
Non-financial firms on CRSP with 
MVE between 50-100 million that 
traded on NYSE, NASDAQ, or 
AMEX and have 10k data 
 575 
   
Less :   
Firms that did not file any exhibits 
in fiscal 2001 125  
   
Firms with sufficient data to 
compute turnover proxies  450 
   
Less   
Firms with missing TAQ data16 23  
   
Firms with data to compute adverse 
selection and moral hazard proxies  427 
   
 30
Table 2 
 
Industry Composition of the Sample 
 
 
Two Digit SIC 
Code 
Industry Name Number of firms 
 
13 Oil and Gas Extraction 17 
20 Food and Kindred Products 6 
28 Chemicals and Allied Products 37 
33 Primary Metal industries 10 
35 Industrial Machinery and Equipment 23 
36 Electronic and Other Electronic Equipment 31 
37 Transportation Equipment 7 
38 Instruments and Related Products 38 
48 Communications 14 
49 Electric, gas, and sanitary services 10 
50 Wholesale Trade – Durable Goods 8 
51 Wholesale Trade- Non Durable Goods 12 
58 Eating and Drinking places 7 
59 Miscellaneous retail 8 
61 Non-Depository Credit Institutions 6 
62 Security and Commodity brokers 5 
67 Holding and other investment offices 6 
73 Business Services 84 
80 Health Services 9 
87 Engineering and management services 15 
--- Firms in industries with fewer than 5 firms 97 
   
 Total 450 
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Table 3 
 
Descriptive Information on the types of Exhibits filed by the firms in our sample 
 
 
Panel A:  Exhibits filed without any redacted information (for the 684 firms that have 10k 
information available on Lexis/nexis) 
 
 Total number of 
exhibits filed in 
fiscal year 2001 for 
the firms in our 
sample 
Average number 
of exhibits filed 
by firm 
Maximum number of 
exhibits filed by a 
firm in our sample 
Debt related  641 1.42 22 
Employment (option 
plans, offer letters, 
severance etc..)  
 
1035 
 
2.30 
 
20 
Asset Purchase 37 0.08 3 
Purchase/sale of 
inventory or services 
 
109 
 
0.25 
 
12 
License  83 0.18 5 
Merger related  20 0.04 4 
Leases 191 0.42 9 
Equity related 
disclosures 
 
386 
 
0.86 
 
33 
Other 799 1.77 47 
    
Total 3301 7.33  
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Table 3 
 
Descriptive Information on the types of Exhibits filed by the firms in our sample 
 
 
Panel B:  Exhibits filed in which there was information redacted (for the 684 firms that 
have 10k information available on Lexis/nexis) 
 
 
 Total number of 
exhibits filed in 
fiscal year 2001 with 
redacted info for the 
firms in our sample 
Average number 
of exhibits filed 
with redacted 
info by firm 
Maximum number of 
exhibits with 
redacted info filed by 
a firm in our sample 
Debt related  7 0.02 5 
Employment (option 
plans, offer letters, 
severance etc..)  
 
7 
 
0.02 
 
2 
Asset Purchase 3 0.01 1 
Purchase/sale of 
inventory or services 
 
30 
 
0.07 
 
9 
License  39 0.09 4 
Merger related  0 0 0 
Leases 0 0 0 
Equity related 
disclosures 
 
8 
 
0.02 
 
3 
Other 105 0.23 16 
    
Total 199 0.44  
    
Number of firms 
filing at least one 
request to redact data 
from an exhibit  in 
2001 
 
 
74 
  
    
Number of firms that 
had filed a request to 
redact data at some 
point as per their 
2001 10K 
 
 
122 
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Table 4 
 
Descriptive Statistics – All Firms in Final Sample 
 
 
Variable 
 
Q1 
Mean 
(Median) 
 
Q3 
 
Std Dev 
Redactdum 0.00 
0.16 
(0.00) 0.00 0.37 
Debt_Issue 0.00 
0.44 
(0.00) 1.00 0.49 
Equity_Issue 0.00 
0.18 
(0.00) 0.00 0.38 
Hindex 11.5 
226.5 
(191.5) 334.5 130.0 
ROA -0.35 
-0.24 
(-0.04) 0.03 0.68 
Loss 0.00 
0.62 
(1.00) 1.00 0.48 
LN MVE 10.91 
11.18 
(11.18) 11.41 0.52 
 
LN(Num of Exib) 1.10 
1.57 
(1.60) 2.30 0.93 
Adv_Select 0.11 
0.19 
(0.14) 0.20 0.16 
$Depth 21.5 
44.0 
(34.6) 56 31.1 
Monthly_Turnover 0.03 
0.08 
(0.06) 0.10 0.08 
NYSE 1.00 
0.78 
(1.00) 1.00 0.41 
AMEX 0.00 
0.08 
(0.00) 0.00 0.27 
LN Price 1.15 
1.62 
(1.61) 2.11 0.74 
Number of Firms – 450 (except for $depth and adv-selection variables in which case it 
is 427)  
 
Variable Definitions 
Redactdum – An indicator variable set equal to one if the firm filed a requests for 
confidential treatment for the fiscal year 2001, zero otherwise. 
Debt_Issue -  Indicator variable that is 1 if the firm issued debt during fiscal 2001 
(COMPUSTAT data item 111) , 0 otherwise. 
Equity_Issue – Indicator variable that is 1 if the firm issued equity during fiscal 2001 (as 
per the SDC database0, 0 otherwise. 
Hindex – The rank of the industries Herfindahl index.  The Herfindahl index calculated 
as the sum of the squared market share of each publicly traded company in a particular 
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the 2 digit SIC code.  Market share is calculated as the sales of a particular company 
divided by the total sales of the SIC code.  
ROA – Net income/Assets (CMPUSTAT data items 172 and 6). 
Loss – Indicator variable that is 1 if the firm had a loss, 0 otherwise. 
Adv_Select  - We use the methodology proposed in Glosten and Harris (1988) and the 
trade identification procedure proposed by Lee and Ready (1991) to calculate the 
percentage of the spread that is related to adverse selection.  We use the in trade and 
quote data for our sample firms for the 15 month period beginning the first day of fiscal 
year 2001 and ending 3 months after the end of the fiscal year. 
$Depth – Calculated using the TAQ quote files.  We first calculate the dollar depth for an 
individual trade by adding the number of shares offered at the bid multiplied by the bid 
price and the number of shares offered at the ask multiplied by the asking price.  We 
divide the resulting sum by 2.  The resulting variable is a measure of quoted $Depth.  
Finally, we then calculate the median $depth for each firm/day in our sample for the 15 
month period beginning the first day of fiscal year 2001 and ending 3 months after the 
end of the fiscal year.  The final variable is the average of these daily $depths. 
Monthly Turnover – Calculated by dividing the monthly volume of shares traded by the 
number of shares outstanding for each firm month for the 15 month period beginning the 
first day of fiscal year 2001 and ending 3 months after the end of the fiscal year.  The 
average monthly turnover for the firm is then determined. 
Ln(Num of Exib) –  Calculated as the natural log of the number of exhibits filed in fiscal 
2001. 
LNMVE – The natural log of the firm’s market value of equity (in $100,000), calculated 
on December 31, 2001.  
NYSE – Indicator that is one if the firm is traded on the New York Stock Exchange, zero 
otherwise. 
AMEX- Indicator variable that is one if the firm is traded on the American stock 
exchange, zero otherwise. 
LnPrice – The natural log of the median price per share for the 15 month period 
beginning the first day of fiscal year 2001 and ending 3 months after the end of the fiscal 
year. 
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Table 5 
 
Regression Results – Spread, Volatility, and Turnover Regressions 
 
Model 1:  Adv_Select = α Intercept   β1 RedactDum + β2LnNumofExib +   β3LnMVE + 
β4NYSE + β5 AMEX  + β6 LNPrice + ε  
 
Model 2:  $Depth = α Intercept + β1 RedactDum + β2LnNumofExib +   β3LnMVE + 
β4NYSE + β5 AMEX + β6 LNPrice + ε 
 
Model 3:  MonthlyTurnover = α Intercept + β1 RedactDum + β2LnNumofExib +   
β3LnMVE + β4NYSE + β5 AMEX + β6 LNPrice + ε 
 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
 
Variable 
Pred. 
Sign 
Coefficient 
(T-Statistic) 
Pred 
Sign 
Coefficient  
(T-Statistic) 
Pred 
Sign 
Coefficient  
(T-Statistic) 
Intercept ? 
1.00 
  (14.51)*** ? 
88.42 
(3.86)*** ? 
-0.57 
    (-7.87)*** 
RedactDum + 
0.02 
(1.70)** - 
-5.99 
   (-2.01)**  - 
-0.01 
 (-1.94)** 
LnNumofExib ? 
-0.001 
(-0.32) ? 
1.05 
(0.93) ? 
0.01 
   (2.83)*** 
LNMVE - 
-0.06 
(-9.57)*** + 
-3.65 
(-1.79)* + 
0.05 
   (8.20)*** 
NYSE ? 
-0.30 
(-30.66)*** ? 
-43.89 
 (-13.46)*** ? 
0.04 
  (4.56)*** 
AMEX ? 
0.10 
(7.25)*** ? 
-9.23 
(-1.77)* ? 
0.01 
(0.01) 
LNPrice ? 
0.05 
(11.65)*** ? 
21.20 
(13.82)*** ? 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Coefficients and T-Stats on Industry indicators are suppressed 
Adjusted R-
Squared  83.7% 
  
56.4% 
 
21.6% 
Number Obs  427  427  450 
*,**,*** Statistically significant at the 10,5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
Variable Definitions 
Adv_Select  - We use the methodology proposed in Glosten and Harris (1988) and the 
trade identification procedure proposed by Lee and Ready (1991) to calculate the 
percentage of the spread that is related to adverse selection.  We use the in trade and 
quote data for our sample firms for the 15 month period beginning the first day of fiscal 
year 2001 and ending 3 months after the end of the fiscal year. 
$Depth – Calculated using the TAQ quote files.  We first calculate the dollar depth for an 
individual trade by adding the number of shares offered at the bid multiplied by the bid 
price and the number of shares offered at the ask multiplied by the asking price.  We 
divide the resulting sum by 2.  The resulting variable is a measure of quoted $Depth.  
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Finally, we then calculate the median $depth for each firm/day in our sample for the 15 
month period beginning the first day of fiscal year 2001 and ending 3 months after the 
end of the fiscal year.  The final variable is the average of these daily $depths. 
Monthly Turnover – Calculated by dividing the monthly volume of shares traded by the 
number of shares outstanding for each firm month for the 15 month period beginning the 
first day of fiscal year 2001 and ending 3 months after the end of the fiscal year.  The 
average monthly turnover for the firm is then determined. 
Redactdum – An indicator variable set equal to one if the firm filed a requests for 
confidential treatment for the fiscal year 2001, zero otherwise. 
Ln(Num of Exib) –  Calculated as the natural log of the number of exhibits filed in fiscal 
2001. 
LNMVE – The natural log of the firm’s market value of equity (in $100,000), calculated 
on December 31, 2001.  
NYSE – Indicator that is one if the firm is traded on the New York Stock Exchange, zero 
otherwise. 
AMEX- Indicator variable that is one if the firm is traded on the American stock 
exchange, zero otherwise. 
LnPrice – The natural log of the median price per share for the 15 month period 
beginning the first day of fiscal year 2001 and ending 3 months after the end of the fiscal 
year. 
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Table 6 
 
Probit regression examining the determinants of the decision to redact information from 
the material contracts filed with a firm’s financial reports 
 
Model 4:  Redactdum = α Intercept  + β1 Equity_Issue + β2 Debt_Issue + β3Hindex + 
β4ROA+ β5 Loss  + β6 LnMVE  + β5 Ln(NumofExib)  + ε  
 
 
 
 
Variable 
Predicted  
Sign 
Coefficient 
(Chi_sqr) 
Intercept 
 
? 
-1.77 
     (-1.10)** 
Equity_Issue 
 
- 
0.12 
 (0.39) 
Debt_Issue 
 
- 
-0.41 
       (6.25)*** 
Hindex 
 
? 
-0.002 
     (-13.36)** 
ROA 
 
? 
0.05 
(0.20) 
Loss 
 
? 
0.50 
     (6.21)*** 
LnMVE 
 
? 
0.36 
(0.06) 
Ln(Num of Exib) 
 
? 
0.39 
       (19.47)*** 
Pseudo R-Squared  16.2% 
Variable Definitions: 
 
Redactdum  -  Indicator variable that is 1 if the firm redacted information form a 
disclosure during fiscal year 2001, 0 otherwise. 
Debt_Issue -  Indicator variable that is 1 if the firm issued debt during fiscal 2001 
(COMPUSTAT data item 111) , 0 otherwise. 
Equity_Issue – Indicator variable that is 1 if the firm issued equity during fiscal 2001 (as 
per the SDC database0, 0 otherwise. 
Hindex – The rank of the industries Herfindahl index.  The Herfindahl index calculated 
as the sum of the squared market share of each publicly traded company in a particular 
the 2 digit SIC code.  Market share is calculated as the sales of a particular company 
divided by the total sales of the SIC code.  
ROA – Net income/Assets (CMPUSTAT data items 172 and 6). 
Loss – Indicator variable that is 1 if the firm had a loss, 0 otherwise. 
LNMVE – The natural log of the firm’s market value of equity (in $100,000), calculated 
on December 31, 2001.  
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Ln(Num of Exib) –  Calculated as the natural log of the number of exhibits filed in fiscal 
2001. 
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Table 7 
 
Regression Results – Spread, Volatility, and Turnover Regressions 
with controls for self-selection  
 
Model 1:  Adv_Select = α Intercept   β1 RedactDum + β2LnNumofExib +   β3LnMVE + 
β4NYSE + β5 AMEX  + β6 LNPrice + β7 IMILL  + ε  
 
Model 2:  $Depth = α Intercept + β1 RedactDum + β2LnNumofExib +   β3LnMVE + 
β4NYSE + β5 AMEX + β6 LNPrice + β7 IMILL  + ε  
 
Model 3:  MonthlyTurnover = α Intercept + β1 RedactDum + β2LnNumofExib +   
β3LnMVE + β4NYSE + β5 AMEX + β6 LNPrice + β7 IMILL  + ε  
 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
 
Variable 
Pred. 
Sign 
Coefficient 
(T-Statistic) 
Pred 
Sign 
Coefficient  
(T-Statistic) 
Pred 
Sign 
Coefficient  
(T-Statistic) 
Intercept ? 
1.04 
   (14.77)*** ? 
81.53 
(3.47)*** ? 
-0.54 
      (-7.13)*** 
Redactdum - 
0.08 
(2.34)*** + 
-27.92 
(-2.51)*** + 
0.04 
(1.04) 
Ln(Num of 
Exhib) + 
-0.006 
(-1.52) - 
3.05 
(2.08)** - 
0.005 
(1.12) 
LNMVE - 
-0.06 
(-10.01)*** - 
-3.03 
(-1.45) + 
0.05 
     (7.43)*** 
NYSE ? 
-0.31 
(-30.47)*** ? 
-42.89 
(-12.95)*** ? 
0.04 
       (3.85)*** 
AMEX ? 
0.09 
(6.92)*** ? 
-7.87 
(-1.67)* ? 
-0.005 
(-0.35) 
LNPrice - 
0.05 
(11.82)*** - 
20.58 
(13.15)*** - 
0.004 
(0.87) 
IMILL ? 
-0.03 
(-1.86)* 
 
? 
13.15 
(2.08)** 
 
? 
-0.03 
(-1.61) 
Coefficients and T-Stats on industry indicator variables are surpressed 
Adjusted 
R-Squared  83.4% 
  
55.1% 
  
20.8% 
Number Obs       
*,**,*** Statistically significant at the 10,5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
Variable Definitions 
Adv_Select  - We use the methodology proposed in Glosten and Harris (1988) and the 
trade identification procedure proposed by Lee and Ready (1991) to calculate the 
percentage of the spread that is related to adverse selection.  We use the in trade and 
quote data for our sample firms for the 15 month period beginning the first day of fiscal 
year 2001 and ending 3 months after the end of the fiscal year. 
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$Depth – Calculated using the TAQ quote files.  We first calculate the dollar depth for an 
individual trade by adding the number of shares offered at the bid multiplied by the bid 
price and the number of shares offered at the ask multiplied by the asking price.  We 
divide the resulting sum by 2.  The resulting variable is a measure of quoted $Depth.  
Finally, we then calculate the median $depth for each firm/day in our sample for the 15 
month period beginning the first day of fiscal year 2001 and ending 3 months after the 
end of the fiscal year.  The final variable is the average of these daily $depths. 
Monthly Turnover – Calculated by dividing the monthly volume of shares traded by the 
number of shares outstanding for each firm month for the 15 month period beginning the 
first day of fiscal year 2001 and ending 3 months after the end of the fiscal year.  The 
average monthly turnover for the firm is then determined. 
Redactdum – An indicator variable set equal to one if the firm filed a requests for 
confidential treatment for the fiscal year 2001, zero otherwise. 
Ln(Num of Exib) –  Calculated as the natural log of the number of exhibits filed in fiscal 
2001. 
LNMVE – The natural log of the firm’s market value of equity (in $100,000), calculated 
on December 31, 2001.  
NYSE – Indicator that is one if the firm is traded on the New York Stock Exchange, zero 
otherwise. 
AMEX- Indicator variable that is one if the firm is traded on the American stock 
exchange, zero otherwise. 
LnPrice – The natural log of the median price per share for the 15 month period 
beginning the first day of fiscal year 2001 and ending 3 months after the end of the fiscal 
year. 
IMILL - The inverse mills ratio calculated from model 1 Table 7 panel A.  
 
